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The Refugee: A Problem of Definition
Austin T. Fragomen, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
HE ERA SINCE THE END of World War II has been marked
by great technological progress and social change. It has also
been a time of civil turmoil, war, pestilence, and oppression in
many countries of the world. A result of the turbulence and ferment
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17.2 million,2 and by June 1969
that characterizes the past 25
years has been the displacement
from their homes of millions
of persons each year. The ref-
ugee population of the world
is growing and continues to
grow. In 1959, it was esti-
mated that there were 15 mil-
lion refugees.' In June 1968,
the estimate had increased to
another 100,000 became statistics
in the saga of Man's inability to live with his fellow man.'
The total number of refugees is the aggregate of many individuals
who have been uprooted by greatly differing circumstances. The
reasons for flight vary for each refugee group as do their opportuni-
ties for asylum and resettlement. The Mozambique refugee fleeing
to Zambia may have had an entirely different motivation from the
Tibetan refugee fleeing to Sikkim. The situation resulting in the
displacement of the Palestinian Arab refugee is dissimilar to the
factors resulting in the displacement of the Indonesian Chinese ref-
ugee within Indonesia. The opportunities for permanent resettle-
ment and integration of the Bulgarian refugee in Belgium are more
substantial than those of the Chinese refugee from Communist
China in Hong Kong. However, each refugee is a person desper-
ately in need of assistance.
Such aid is available to the refugee on several levels: The United
Nations takes an active role in the protection and welfare of ref-
1 UNITED STATES COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE REPORT 2
(1969).
21d. at 3.
3 UNITED STATES COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE REPORT 2
(1970).
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ugees; numerous countries have extensive refugee programs; and
assistance on a massive scale is provided by the private sector,
particularly voluntary agencies.
Each entity involved in aiding refugees must establish criteria
of precisely who is deserving of or entitled to their help. Thus,
the formulation of a definition becomes exceedingly important.
The policy of any body - international, national, or private -
toward the refugee is a function of the definition utilized to designate
an individual or group of individuals as refugees. Definitions are
customarily adopted which take into account the capability and de-
sire of a State or multi-national body to offer assistance to refugees.
The type of assistance to be offered is highly relevant in evaluating
the scope of the definition. When material assistance will be sup-
plied to persons in a foreign country a broader definition will usually
result than when asylum is offered or rights guaranteed. Each
State adopts a definition under its national law dependent upon a
complex set of elements motivated by humanitarian concern and
by both internal and external political pressures. Formulation of
international definitions is similarly a result of these factors.4
A -definition which is applicable only to a predetermined group
leaves little question as to who comes within the criteria of eligibil-
ity. Unpredictable occurrences which could result in new groups
of persons becoming eleigible can be eliminated. A general defi-
nition of the term "refugee" contains the risk of future unpredicta-
bility. How many persons or what type may fall within the personal
scope of the definition and become entitled to the benefits thereunder
cannot be foreseen.
Thus, each State, as a result of its geographical location, internal
political composition, and national prejudices and philosophy, will
react to the question of the refugee in light of its parochial interests.
In the formulation of an acceptable international definition, each
State will strive to protect its own concerns. The process of politi-
cal compromise ensues. Because the resultant definition must be
acceptable to a maximum number of States, it necessarily will be
circumscribed in scope.
4 Consider the following statement made by Jacques Vernant, a well-known author
on refugees:
The difficulty of confining within the limits of a definition at the same time
general and precise, the living reality, coupled with the legitimate anxieties of
governments, has the result that in international decisions and agreements the
categories of persons to whom they apply have generally been carefully re-
stricted by reference to race, geography, and time.
J. VERNANT, THE REFUGEE IN THE POST WAR WORLD 8-9 (1959).
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In formulating a strictly national policy, a State may be even
more inhibited by internal considerations. Moreover, the individual
State must be more aware of the foreign relations aspects of its
refugee policy.
This article will examine, in the context of the above general
observations, the primary definition in the international arena and
the definition utilized by the United States under its national laws,
with a view toward enlarging the personal scope of both.
I. INTERNATIONAL POLICY
A. Historical Background
Until the past decade, the refugee has been regarded as primarily
a European phenomenon. With the upsurgence of political unrest
in the developing States, the emphasis is beginning to change.
Following World War I, the first international instrument deal-
ing with the refugee was adopted.5 This document pertained ex-
clusively to refugees from Russia. Agreements continued to remain
narrow in scope - limited to specific groups of refugees, escapees,
and displaced persons - until after the termination of World War
11.6
At the close of World War II, the presence of approximately
one million displaced persons, primarily Europeans who refused to
be repatriated, compelled the United Nations to approach the prob-
lem of the refugee on a broader scale than the previous piecemeal
method. The deliberations of the United Nations led to the adop-
tion of the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization.7
This organization and its Preparatory Commission carried out all
5Arrangement of 5th July 1922, 13 L.N.T.S. 355.
6 See, e.g., Arrangement of 12th May 1926, 89 L.N.T.S. No. 2004; Arrangement of
30th June 1928, 89 L.N.T.S. No. 2005; Convention Relating to the International Status
of Refugees of 28th October 1933, 159 L.N.T.S. No. 3663 (all limited to Russian
and Armenian refugees); Arrangement of 30th June 1928, 89 L.N.T.S. No. 2006
(limited to Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldian, and Turkish refugees); Provisional Arrangment
of 4th July 1936, 171 L.N.T.S. No. 3952 (limited to German refugees). An excellent
example of such legislaion is the following definition of a Palestinian refugee con-
tained in the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestine ref-
ugees in the Near East which was established in 1949.
A person registered with UNRWA whose normal residence was Palestine for
a minimum of two years immediately preceeding the outbreak of the conflict
in 1948 and who, as a result of this conflict, has lost both his home and his
means of livelihood .... To be eligible for UNRWA assistance, the refugee
must have taken refuge in 1948 in one of the few "host" countries in which
UNRWA operates, namely - Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, as well as the Gaza Strip.
7 See Weis, The International Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, 83 JOURNAL
Du DROIT INTERNATIONAL 12 (1956).
1970]
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international work for existing groups of refugees from September
1, 1946, to its liquidation in 1952.8
In December 1950, the General Assembly of the United Nations
adopted the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Com-
missioner's Office for Refugees.' Generally, the purpose of this stat-
ute was to provide a permanent organization within the United
Nations to deal with the subject of refugees in a comprehensive
manner." Along with the statute, the General Assembly adopted
a resolution to convene a conference with the purpose of finalizing
and signing a convention relating to the status of refugees." As a
result of this conference, in 1951 the Convention relating to the
Status of Refugees was opened for signature. 2
Previous international agreements had applied only to specified
categories of persons. The 1951 Convention contained a general
definition of the term "refugee.' "" Upon signing the Convention,
each State may limit the personal scope of the Convention to events
occurring in Europe. 4
The members of the Conference which adopted the Convention
clearly desired it to be broadly interpreted. A recommendation was
included in the final Act that the Convention have value as an ex-
ample exceeding its contractual scope. It provided that all States
should be guided by the Convention in their treatment of persons
in their territories as refugees who were not covered by the terms
of the Convention. 5 The term "events occurring before 1 January
8 Id. The functions of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) included re-
patriation, identification, registration and classification, care and assistance, legal and
political protection, and resettlement and reestablishment of refugees within the man-
date of the organization.
9 G.A. Res. 428, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 2, at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1750 (1950). The
functions of the High Commission for Refugees were to provide international protec-
tion, under the auspices of the United Nations, to refugees who fall within the scope
of the Statute, to assist governments in seeking permanent solutions to the problems
of refugees, and to assist private organizations in facilitating voluntary assimilation of
refugees into new national communities, Id.
10 IRO was temporary from its inception.
11 G.A. Res. 429, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/1751 (1950)
(Conference to be convened). Simultaneously, a protocol relating to the status of state-
less persons was adopted.
12 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, entered into force April 22, 1954,
189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter cited as Convention]. See 8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEsT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 695 (1967).
13 See note 27 inIra for the text of the Convention's definition of "refugee."
14 Convention, note 12 supra, Art. IB(2). Any State which has adopted the alter-
native limiting applicability to Europe may extend its obligations at any time by adopt-
ing the alternative including events occurring in Europe or elsewhere.
15 Final Act of the United Nations Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of
[Vol. 3: 45
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1951" has been broadly interpreted. 16 However, thousands of ref-
ugees falling within the definition were created after this date.
Therefore, a Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted
and opened for accession on January 31, 1967."7 The sole purpose of
this Protocol was to drop the temporal limitation.' 8 Thus, the Pro-
tocol gave formal recognition to the fact that refugees have resulted
from events no part of which occurred before January 1, 1951.
The Protocol also served the purpose of reconciling the scope of the
Convention with the competence of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees. The definition contained in the
Statute of the Office of the High Commissioner was virtually identi-
cal to that contained in the Convention except for the dateline of the
Convention. 9
B. International Definition of "Refugee"
The primary definition, for international purposes, of the term
"refugee" is that set forth in the Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees. ° This definition is virtually identical to that contained
in the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees. As noted above, the primary difference in the'
two definitions is the limitation of the Convention to refugees arising
as a result of events occurring prior to January 1, 1951. The Statute
Refugees and Stateless Persons, held at Geneva from July 2, 1951, to July 25, 1951,
189 U.N.T.S. 138. See Weis, The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
and Some Questions of the Law of Treaties, 1967 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 40.
1 6 See Weis, supra note 15, at 40.
17 G.A. Res. 2198, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
18 d.
19 Compare G.A. Res. 428, 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. 20, at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1750
(1950), with Convention, supra note 12.
20 In the international arena, there is one other definition of the term refugee which
is noteworthy. The Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, established
in 1951, defines a refugee as follows:
Among other criteria, a refugee is a person who (1) is stateless or without any
country of nationality, (2) has been or will be denied the right of return to his
country of nationality or former residence, (3) has been forced to leave his
normal country of residence due to racial, political, or religious discrimination,
(4) has been the victim of a war or a disaster which has seriously disadvan-
taged his condition of living, or is unable or unwilling to accept the protec-
tion of the government of his country of origin as a result of fundamental
political dangers and cannot avail himself of the protection of another govern-
ment except as a "right of asylum." Moreover, a person would be regarded as
"prima facie" within the mandate of other international organizations as the
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration or the International
Refugee Organization providing he did not receive resettlement assistance
from one of these organizations, or if he did receive such assistance, that his
integration in a country of resettlement has not been feasible for reasons be-
yond his control or due to compassionate circumstances. Obtained from the
American Council of Voluntary Agencies in New York (1969).
1970]
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contains a definition without dateline. Thus, the competence of
the Office of the High Commissioner extended to many refugee
situations not encompassed by the Convention. The discrepancy
was rectified in 1967 with the adoption of the Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees. 1 The 1967 Protocol removed the tem-
poral limitation under the Convention in the case of any State
acceding thereto. For States signatory to both the Convention and
the Protocol, or just the Protocol, the definition of the term "refugee"
is virtually identical to that contained in the Statute.
The Convention and the Statute have both direct and indirect
effects. The direct effect of the Convention is the establishment of
certain basic standards for the treatment of refugees and the creation
of certain rights and freedoms for refugees. The Convention rec-
ognizes that the most urgent need of the refugee is to be accorded
asylum. The Convention does not regulate the right of admission
into the country of a refugee, but recognizes the duress to which a
refugee is subject when fleeing from a State where he fears per-
secution and protects him against deportation or forced return to
such a State. 2 The Convention also sets forth minimum standards
for the treatment of refugees by signatory States. Included among
the rights guaranteed the refugee within the State of asylum, to the
extent such rights are assured nationals of that State, are the fol-
lowing: freedom to practice religion, equal educational opportu-
nities, right to social security and public welfare assistance, right to
work, right to obtain housing, and right to acquire property.23
The basic function of the Statute of the Office of the High Com-
missioner for Refugees is to provide international protection and
material assistance to all refugees within his competence as set forth
by the Statute.
21 G.A. Res. 2198, supra note 17.
22 Weis, The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 42 INTERPRETER
RELBASES 4 (1965). Weis explains as follows:
Thus, Contracting States may not impose penalties, on account of their illegal
entry or presence, on refugees coming directly from a territory where their
life or freedom are threatened provided they present themselves without de-
lay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.
(Article 31 (1)). Moreover, no Contracting State may expel or return (re-
fouler) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. A
refugee is thus protected against deportation not only to the country of his
nationality but to any country in regard to which he fears persecution. (Ar-
ticle 33(1) ).
23 Convention, supra note 12.
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Only those persons falling within the definition of the Conven-
tion or the Statute are eligible to receive the benefits provided.
The definition contained in these international documents also
has an indirect effect. The criteria of eligibility as established by
the Convention or Statute are frequently incorporated into the na-
tional laws of States in determining the status of the refugee in
that particular State. The tendency of States to emulate the inter-
national definition is a result of the world wide nature of the ref-
ugee situation. In 1960, a public law was enacted in the United
States which based the admission of refugees into the United States
upon the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees.24 In Germany, persons coming within the definition
are granted asylum under national law.25 Under Italian national
law, the definition contained in the Convention is considered as a
definition of those persons who are entitled to asylum in Italy under
Article 10 of the Italian Constitution.26
It is important to analyze the definition and determine precisely
to whom it applies. Each phrase has great significance in that entire
refugee groups can be either excluded or included from substantial
benefits by slight alterations in the language of a particular law.
Because of the similarity of the Convention and the Statute, ref-
erence will be made to the definiton of "refugee" contained in the
Convention.27
24 Act of July 14, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-648, § 1, 74 Stat. 504. Specifically, this
law authorized the Attorney General to parole refugees into the United States, under
the provisions of section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5) (1964), if the alien "(1) applies for parole while physically present
within the limits of any country which is not Communist, Communist-dominated, or
Communist-occupied, (2) is not a national of the area in which the application is made,
and (3) is within the mandate of the United Naions High Commissioner for Refugees."
74 Stat. at 504. The same law provided that an alien paroled into the United States,
pursuant to this provision, would be eligible to adjust his status to that of a lawfully
admitted permanent resident alien after a period of two years. Id. at 505. However,
Congress later repealed the parole refugee provision, Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-236, § 16, 79 Stat. 919, while retaining the provision for an alien paroled into the
United States. Id.
25 Asylum Ordinance of January 6, 1953, Bundergesetzblatt, part I at 3. See Weis,
The Concept of the Refugee in International Law, 87 JOURNAL Dli DROIT INTERNA-
NATIONAL 941 (1960).
26 Id.
27 The term "Refugee," as defined in Article A(1) of the Convention, applies to
any person who:
1) Has been considered a refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926
and 30 June 1928 or under the Conventions of 28 October 1933 and 10
February 1938, the Protocol of 14 September 1939 or the Constitution of the
International Refugee Organization;
Decisions of non-eligibility taken by the International Refugee Organiza-
tion during the period of its activities shall not prevent the status of refugee
19701
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The Convention also sets forth certain categories of persons to
Whom it does not apply. Included within the exclusionary provi-
sions are the following basic groups: Persons presently receiving
protection or assistance from organs or agencies of the United Na-
tions other than the United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees; persons recognized by competent authorities of the State in
which they have taken residence to acquire the rights and obligations
attached to the possession of nationality of that State; and persons
who are war criminals or who have committed serious non-political
crimes outside their State of refuge prior to their admission as
refugees.1
8
Section A(1) is designed to assure continuing refugee classifica-
tion to the persons falling within the provisions of the designated
six prior agreements." The second paragraph of section A(1)
clearly indicates that the determination of non-eligibility by the
International Refugee Organization (IRO) is not absolute. A fur-
ther determination can be made under the general definition con-
tained in section A(2).
being accorded o persons who fulfill the conditions of paragraph 2 of this
section;
2) As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a na-
tionality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return
to it.
In the case of a person who has more than one nationality, the term "the
country of his nationality" shall mean each of the countries of which he is a
national, and a person shall not be deemed to be lacking the protection of
the country of his nationality if, without any valid reason based on well-
founded fear, he has not availed himself of the protection of one of the coun-
tries of which he is a national.
28 Convention, art. I(D)-(F).
29 Arrangement of 12 May 1926 pertained to Russian and Armenian refugees. Ar-
rangement of 30 June 1928 was limited to Assyrian, Assyro-Chaldean, and Turkish
refugees. Convention of 28 October 1933, the so-called Nansen Convention, applied
to Russian, Armenian, and assimilated refugees as defined in the Arrangements of 12
May 1926 and 30 June 1928. Convention of 10 February 1938 and the Protocol of
14 September 1939 applied to refugees coming from Germany and Austria. See note
6 supra. The Constitution of the International Refugee Organization set forth a rather
complex definition of the term refugee coming within the competence of the Organiza-
tion. It was broad in scope and designed to encompass various types of ethnic groups
and displaced persons who refused to return to their homelands after World War II.
The determination of whether an individual comes within the purview of one of
these agreements can be a difficult task unless there is evidence of the issuance of a
travel document, official certificate, and other attesting documentation. Persons falling
within the definition of the IRO are not as problematic since the IRO issues elligibility
certificates. See Weis, supra note 25, at 967.
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Article I(B) of the Convention declares that each contracting
State at the time of signature must determine whether for the pur-
poses of the Convention, -the words "events occurring before 1
January 1951" in Article I(A) (2) shall be understood to be limited
solely to "events occurring in Europe" during this period or shall be
understood to mean "events occurring in Europe or elsewhere" dur-
ing the same period. Obviously, in so choosing, each signatory has
the ability to limit the origin of refugees it will receive solely to
European States.
The legislative history pertinent to the temporal limitation of
events occurring before January 1, 1951, indicates a somewhat in-
consistent philosophy. The Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on
Refugees and Stateless Persons, which drew up the Convention,
acknowledges the political reality that governments would be re-
luctant to undertake an obligation toward future refugees the origin
and number of which would be unknown at the time of signature."
However, the Ad Hoc Committee simultaneously noted that the
limitation should be broadly interpreted. Included would be "per-
sons who may become refugees at a later date as a result of events
before then, or as a result of after-events which occur at a later
date.' '1
The next phrase encountered in the definition, "owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted," contains both an objective and
a subjective criterion. Fear is indeed a very personal response to a
situation. However, the fear must not only be present, it must also
be reasonable under the circumstances. The Ad Hoc Committee
described "well-founded fear" to mean "that a person has either
actually been a victim of persecution or can show good reason why
30 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Refugees and Stateless Persons, U.N. Doc.
E/1618 at 38 (1951).
The Committee discussed whether it would include in a definition all refugees
irrespective of their origin and of the fact that the events which caused the
rupture with their country of origin belong to the past or future. The Com-
mittee put aside this solution believing it would be difficult for a Government
to sign a blank cheque and undertake obligations toward future refugees, the
origin and number of which would be unknown.
3 1 Id. at 39. The Report also states that in interpreting "as a result of events in
Europe" occurances "which are after-effects of earlier changes" are within the scope of
the definition.
Weis refers to two decisions of the Austrian Supreme Court which "held that
Hungarian refugees in consequence of events of October 1956 were refugees 'as a result
of events before 1 January 1951' as these events were after-effects of earlier changes
... " The same decision was reached by the Bavarian Administrative Court of second
instance in Munich. This view was also taken by the representatives of Austria, Bel-
gium, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden in the Subcommittee of the United
Nations Refugee Fund Executive Committee. See, Weis, supra note 255, at 969.
1970)
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be fears persecution .... 32 Where the individual in question has
actually been a victim of persecution, it is sometimes difficult to
ascertain whether the alleged persecution was in fact persecution of
the type justifying refugee status under the Convention. Frequently,
a mentally unbalanced person will feel that he was subject to perse-
cution when the normal person under similar circumstances would
not have reacted in the same manner.
Determining precisely what constitutes persecution can be dif-
ficult. The Convention contains no definition.33  However, Article
33 forbids a contracting State from expelling a refugee to a territory
where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group,
or political opinion. Thus, certain conduct, such as threatening life
or freedom, would constitute "persecution." Because persecution is
a factual question, the official must have broad latitude in making
the determination as to whether the person claiming the benefit is in
fact persecuted. It is clear, however, that "persecution" is not re-
stricted solely to physical abuse or incarceration. 34
Persecution must be "for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion." Once
again the official making the determination has discretion. The
grounds of persecution set forth by the Convention are sufficiently
broad so that the major grounds for discrimination or oppression
have been included. The words are self-explanatory. A social
group is essentially a social class.
Note the requirement that the refugee
3 2 Supra note 30, at 39.
33 Weis, supra note 25, at 22. He points out that the failure to define the term
"persecution" was probably deliberate.
34 Id. Officials of the State in which the alleged refugee is seeking the benefits of
the Convention must make the determination of persecution. Thus, the analogy to the
interpretation of the term "persecution" in national statutes of the State is of signif-
icance.
Section 1253(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes the Attorney
General of the United States to withhold the deportation of an alien "to any country in
which in his opinion the alien would be subject to persecution on account of race, reli-
gion, or political opinion .... " 8 U.S.C. § 1253 (h) (Supp. IV, 1969). Interpretation
of section 1253(h) by federal courts establishes that the range of conduct constituting
persecution is broad and can include deprivation of economic opportunities as well as
corporal punishment or incarceration. See Soric v. Flagg, 303 F.2d 289 (7th Cir.
1962); Diminich v. Esperdy, 299 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1961); Dunat v. Hurney, 297
F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1961). However, the potential of experiencing economic difficulties
and physical hardships in a State does not constitute persecution. Cheng Kai Fu v.
Immigration & Naturalization Service, 386 F.2d 750 (2d Cit. 1967) cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1003 (1968).
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is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing
to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his -former habitual residence as a result of such events,
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 'return to it.
The primary requirement contained in this definition is that the
alien is outside his State of nationality or former habitual residence.
Thus, the person must first depart or flee from his homeland before
he is eligible for refugee status. If he is outside his homeland
when conditions change in such a manner that his return would lead
to a well-founded fear of persecution, the person is classified as a
refugee. Moreover, conduct in which the person has engaged while
outside of his homeland may also give rise to a well-founded fear
of persecution upon his return.
The Ad Hoc Committee described the term "former habitual
residence" of a refugee in 'a rather straight forward fashion, as
"the country in which he had resided and where he had suffered
or fears he would suffer persecution if he returned." 5
The definition speaks of two groups of persons - those having
a nationality and those not having a nationality. According to
general principles of international law, the nationality of an indi-
vidual is to be determined solely by the national laws of the State
involved.3 6
The Ad Hoc Committee spoke in more depth concerning the
requirement that the alien "is unable, or owing to such fear, is un-
willing to avail himself of the protection of that country ......
The Committee agreed that for the purposes of this sub-para-
graph and sub-paragraph A(2)(c), and therefore for the draft
Convention as a whole, "unable" refers primarily to stateless ref-
ugees but includes also refugees possessing a nationality who are
refused passports or other protection by their own Government.
"Unwilling" refers to refugees who refuse to accept the protection
of the government of their nationality. 7
35 U.N. Doc. E/1618, supra note 30, at 39.
36 See Weis, supra note 25, at 973. The determination of nationaliy can be an
exceedingly complex question. Under Unied States law, there are grounds for loss of
citizenship, grounds for bars to citizenship, and grounds for expatriation. See Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, tit. III, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1401 et seq. (1970). Numerous
Supreme Court decisions have declared unconstitutional or refined many of these pro-
visions. E.g., Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); Marks v. Esperdy, 377 U.S. 214
(1964); Sneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372
U.S. 144 (1963); Polites v. United States, 364 U.S. 426 (1960); Hishikawa v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 129 (1958); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S.
44 (1958); Ceballos v. Shaughnessy, 352 U.S. 599 (1957).
37 U.N. Doc. E/1618, supra note 30, at 39. The explanation of the term "unable"
could assume particular significance in light of the revocation of or refusal to reissue
19701
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The refugee must be unwilling to avail himself of protection of his
homeland as a result of his fear of persecution.
C. Who Falls Within the Definition?
According to the best information and estimates available to
the Department of State, there are approximately 3,490,000 refugees
in States of asylum throughout the world who meet the definition
of "refugee" as set forth in the Statute of the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 8 However, the United
States Committee for Refugees estimates that there are 17,318,320
refugees in the world: 5,206,213 from Africa; 7,162,435 from Asia;
1,819,527 from the Middle East; 869,619 from Europe and the
United Kingdom; and 2,260,526 from the Western Hemisphere.8"
The tremendous discrepancy between the two estimates is the
direct result of the structure of the definition. The United States
Committee for Refugees attempts to use a more functional definition
without regard to political implications. In arriving at the 17.3
million, a person was considered to be a refugee "if his forced move-
ment (whether within his own country or to asylum elsewhere)
means that he is deprived of a minimally decent life."4
passports to United States military deserters as well as the denial of protection to United
State citizens traveling to prohibited countries (China, North Viet Nam, North Korea,
and Cuba).
38 S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, PROTOCOL RELATING TO REFUGEES, S.
EXEC. REP. No. 14, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1968) (information supplied by the
Department of State). The State Department points out, however, that
Itjhis total does not take into account (1) an undetermined but relatively
small number of the above refugees who have acquired a new nationality
during recent years and thus no longer meet the UNHCR eligibility criteria;
and (2) an undetermined but relatively small number of refugees who were
resettled in earlier years but nevertheless have not yet acquired a new na-
tionality, and thus do fall within the UNHCR definition. Statistics are not
available with respect to these two categories.
Because there are various optional limitations available as to the personal scope of the
Convention and because some nations have not acceded to the Protocol, it is virtually im-
possible to estimate the number of refugees within the ambit of these documents.
However, the lack of operational alternatives to the Statute of the Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) allows a reasonable estimate as to
the number of refugees meeting the international definiion.89 Supra note 3, at 2.
40 Supra note 1, at 3. The full definition is as follows:
Taking into account the many varied legal, political, economic and religious
considerations which bear upon his status as a refugee, we say that a person is
a refugee if his forced movement (whether within his own country or to asylum
elsewhere) means that he is deprived of a minimally decent life.
If he (1) is still in a camp, though he may have a job; (2) has adequate
housing, but no place to work; (3) is well cared for, though still separated
from his family and uncertain whether they can rejoin him; (4) by his loss
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In essence, the primary element of refugee status, under this
criterion, is forced movement and consequent deprivation.
The definition contained in the Convention, with its restrictions
and options, was the product of political compromise. When the
drafters of the Convention defined "'refugee," they purposely tried
to produce a product likely to be accepted by many Governments.4 '
The major group of refugees excluded by the United Nations
standard are those who have not departed from their national
borders although they may desire to depart and, although they
may be discriminated against within their homeland, they remain.
This situation is particularly prevalent in States where repression
and discrimination are manifest.42 In the context of civil wars,
mass dislocations of persons inevitably result; however, the dis-
placed person usually remains within -the State and thus does not
meet the criterion set forth in the definition. 43
There are millions of persons, particularly in Communist and
Communist-dominated States, who desire to flee and seek asylum.44
The 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum provides that everyone
has the right to seek and enjoy asylum.45 Failure to observe this
principle has prevented the oppressed from seeking a new life.
The exclusionary provision, which states that the Convention
does not apply to a person recognized by his country of residence as
having the rights and obligations which are attached to the pos-
of citizenship or forced migration, is deprived of the fundamental elements
of a minimally decent life - he is a refugee.
41 Supra note 30, at 36.
42 The State Department estimates that as of June 30, 1969, there were 40,000
Indoesian Chinese displaced within Indoesia. The United States Committee on Ref-
ugees has the same estimate. Supra note 3.
43 The State Department estimates that as of June 30, 1969, there were 1,197,143
Vietnamese refugees displaced within South Viet Nam and 260,000 Laotian refugees
displaced within Laos. The United States Committee on Refugees has the same esti-
mates. Supra note 3. The United States Committee on Refugees estimates there are
3,500,000 Nigerian and Biafran refugees displaced within Nigeria. Id. Thus, from
these three sources, there are roughly five million refugees not encompassed by the
international definition.
44 These persons are prevented from fleeing through tight border control and in-
ternal regulaion. There is no method of estimating the number of such persons.
However, the experience before and after the establishment of rigid controls is instruc-
tive. The Department of State estimates that between 1945 and 1961, 3.7 million
German refugees fled from the East Zone into West Germany, across the Zonal border
or into West Berlin. Between the erection of the Wall and June 30, 1968, this flow
totaled only 26,800.
Since Premier Castro took power in Cuba, approximately 600,000 refugees have
fled. Supra note 3. However, it is becoming increasingly difficult to leave. Several
months ago Castro announced that no one would be allowed to go to Spain or Mexico.
4 5 G.A. Res. 2312, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/6912 (1967).
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session of the nationality of that State, disqualifies numerous refugees
from eligibility.46
The definition also excludes persons receiving aid from other
organs or agencies of the United Nations. This provision consider-
ably lessens the number of persons coming within the personal
scope of the definition.4 1
De facto refugees are often not considered to fall within the
personal scope of the Statute because of the traditional distinction
drawn between economic and political refugees. Generally, if a
person moves for economic reasons, he is not considered to be a
refugee. However, this distinction is frequently artificial. A per-
son may be deprived of a minimally decent life through civil strife
in his homeland and thus be compelled by circumstances to move.
An official, in attempting to determine his status, may determine
that although he is outside the State of his nationality, his departure
was the result of economic realities rather than persecution. Thus,
the distinction is subject to interpretation.
The phraseology "well-founded fear of persecution" raises the
extremely difficult question of what constitutes persecution. The
determination is usually quite stringent. The de facto refugee re-
sponds in his own manner to the circumstances in his environment.
The interpretation of this phrase, with emphasis on the objective
factors, eliminates many who subjectively have reacted by fleeing.
The strict interpretation of this provision is primarily the result of
the grave political implications inherent in a decision by an official
of an international body that another State persecutes groups of its
citizens.
Applicants for refugee status may have difficulty coming within
one of the enumerated grounds of persecution - race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. Circumstances within their homeland may have forced
them to move. The individual cannot ascribe a particular personal
injustice to his motivation to depart. Frequently, his movements
were the result of a natural calamity, military operations, or civil
war. None of these occurrences would result in the person being
accorded refugee status. It is also interesting to note that Article
46 Convention, supra note 12, art. IE. For instance, the State Department estimates
that there are 1,000,000 Hindus in India who fled or were evicted from Pakistan in
1963. These Hindus in India are entitled to nationality and thus are not within the
definition.
47 The State Department estimates that there are 1,616,000 Palestinian Arab refugees
in the Middle East. Most of these come within the UNRWA and are excluded from
the count.
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6(B) of the Statute, which contains the definition without dateline,
differs slightly from the Convention in that persecution for reasons
of "membership of a particular social group" is excluded from 6(B),
whereas it is contained in the Convention. Particularly in Africa,
much post-1951 persecution has been social class oriented and would
not result in categorizing the oppressed as "refugees" under the Stat-
ute.
Recognition of the limited nature of the United Nations defini-
tion was manifested by the action of the General Assembly in 1959.
A Resolution was adopted which authorized the High Commissioner,
"in respect of refugees who do not come within the competence of
the. United Nations, to use his good offices in the transmission of
contributions designed to provide assistance to these refugees.
' 48
Although the Good Offices Resolution is important in providing
material assistance, the many benefits accompanying the legal status
of a refugee under both the Convention and the Statute do not
accrue. The Good Offices Resolution nonetheless assures some
international aid to de facto refugees.49
In addition to the combined action of States in promulgating the
United Nations definition, the options and restrictions exercised
with regard to the definitions by individual States further limit inter-
national protection available to the refugee. A State which is geo-
graphically adjacent to another from which numerous persons flee
may formulate a refugee policy very different from a State insulated
from a direct flow of refugees. States of first asylum frequently
will accede only to international agreements containing certain re-
strictions. Because of their geographical situation, they are less
able to control the influx of refugees. For instance, it is interesting
48 Good Offices Resolution, G.A. Res. 1388 (1959).
49 One commentator has observed another advantageous quality of the Good Offices
Resolution. Since its initial adoption in 1959, the
• .."Good Offices" role has been referred to in successive resolutions which
progress from a call upon the High Commissioner to use his good office on
behalf of specific groups of refugees to more general authorization to assist
refugees on this basis of "Good Offices."
Also, whereas the earlier general "Good Offices" Resolution spoke of ref-
ugees not under the mandate specifically, the later resolutions do not refer
to the mandate specifically, thus enabling certain assistance to new groups
without the need for specific determination of eligibility. This became im-
portant particularly in Africa where the context and scale made individual
determination a difficult practical matter. Additionally, it avoids both the
problems of interpreting "well founded fear of persecution" and the corollary
necessity for referring by implication to situations within a specific country
in what could be considered a negative or pejorative sense.
Address by Gaynor I. Jacobson, The National Conference on World Refugee Problems,
Nov. 18, 1969.
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to note that 59 States have become party to the Convention relating
to the Status of Refugees, whereas only 43 States have become party
to the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. 50 As mentioned
above, these documents provide for such rights as asylum, work,
:education, public relief and freedom of religion. Austria, The
Federal Republic of Germany, and France, all traditional States of
asylum, have not acceded to the Protocol removing the 1951 date-
line. Moreover, of the 59 States party to the Convention, 14 have
made use of the optional restriction clause to limit the personal
scope of the Convention to persons who are refugees as a result of
'events taking place in Europe.5' The Protocol explicitly continues
the applicability of geographical limitations made under the Con-
vention.52 Thus, a State, by acceding to the Convention before
50 The following breakdown is from State Department index cards:
Country Convention Protocol Israel
Algeria X X Italy
Argentina X X Ivory Coast
Australia X Jamaica
Austria X Kenya
Belgium X X Liberia
Botswana X X Liechtenstein
Brazil X Luxembourg
Burundi X Madagascar
Cameroon X X Monaco
Canada X X Morocco
Central African Netherlands
Republic X X New Zealand
Colombia X Niger
Congo (Brazzavile) X X Nigeria
Congo (Democratic Norway
Republic) X Peru
Cyprus , X X Paraguay
Dahomey X X Portugal
Denmark X X Senegal
Ecuador X X Swaziland
Ethiopia X X Sweden
Federal Republic Switzerland
of Germany X X Togo
Finland X X Tunisia
France X Turkey
Gabon X United Kingdom
Gambia X X United Republic
Ghana X X of Tanzania
Greece X X United States
Guinea X X Tunisia
Holy See X X Yugoslavia
Iceland X X Zambia
Ireland X X
X X
X XX
X
X X
X X
51 Argentina, France, Turkey, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Ecuador, Brazil, Congo
(Brazzaville), Dahomey, Madagascar, Peru, Portugal, and Paraguay. Id.
52 Convention, supra note 17, art. 13. "The present Protocol shall be applied by
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acceding to the Protocol, could elect the restriction to events in
Europe but not be limited by the dateline.
In restricting the geographic scope of these international docu-
ments, there are other devices available as well. For instance, there
are approximately 2,085,000 refugees from Communist China who
would fall within the standard of eligibility as set forth by the
Protocol. Two million are in Hong Kong and 85,000 in Macao,
as well as an undetermined number in Burma and other Southeast
Asian States.53  When the government of the United Kingdom ad-
hered to the Convention and when it acceded to the Protocol, its
actions -did not include Hong Kong. Thus, with regard to the
two million Chinese refugees in Hong Kong, the United Kingdom
is not obligated to accord them those rights granted by the Conven-
tion.
States of secondary asylum, however, have the luxury of admit-
ting refugees in a more thoughtful and controlled fashion. Conse-
quently, they might not accede to any international agreement but
still treat refugees in accordance with the standards laid down by
the Convention.5 4
II. UNITED STATES REFUGEE POLICY
The United States refugee policy is a function of the definition
of "refugee" and the administration of that definition. Through
the wording of the definition and the regulation of procedures to
qualify, the United States is able to control both the quantitative
and the qualitative aspects of the admission of refugees. Moreover,
the foreign policy interests of the United States are similarly pro-
tected.
United States law contains two separate provisions which set
forth refugee standards, each for a different purpose.
the States Party hereto without any geographic limitations, save that existing declara-
tions made by States already Parties to the Convention in accordance with article
IB(l)(a) of the Convention, shall, unless extended under article IB(2) thereof, apply
also under the present Protocol."
53 See S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 39, at 16. (statement of
Mr. Dawson). Under the Territorial clause in the Convention, the acceding State has
the option of acceding individually for each Territory for whose foreign affairs it is
responsible.
54 See Weis, supra note 7, at 46 & 48. A study of States party to the Convention
and/or Protocol would indicate that the majority of States of asylum have acceded. The
observation was made by Weis when numerous States, including the United States,
generally considered as major countries of asylum had not acceded to the Convention.
The basic contention is still valid, however.
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Under the allocation of immigrant visas provided for in section
1153 (a) (7), a certain number is set aside for
aliens who satisfy an Immigration and Naturalization Service of-
ficer at 'an examination dn any non-Communist or non-Communist-
dominated country, (A) that (i) because of persecution or fear of
presecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion they
have fled (I) from any Communist or Communist-dominated coun-
try or area, or (II) from any country within the general area of the
Middle East, and (ii) are unable or unwilling to return to such
country or area on account of race, religion, or political opinion,
and (iii) are not nationals of the countries or areas in which their
application for conditional entry is made; or (B) that they are
persons uprooted by catastrophic natural calamity as defined by the
President who are unable to return to their usual place of abode.55
The second definition of a refugee merely provides that persons
not be deported to a State where "the alien would be subject to
persecution on account of race, religion, or political opinion .. ."
for that period during which persecution would result. 6 Thus,
the latter provision essentially stays deportation of refugees whereas
the former allows the alien entry into the United States.57
The elaborate definition of aliens falling within section
1153(a)(7) is quite restrictive in nature. It recognizes only two
major types of refugees - those who have fled from Communist or
Communist-dominated States and those who have fled from a State
in the Middle East. Persons displaced by a natural calamity also
5 5 Immigration and Nationality Act § 203(a) (7), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (7) (Supp.
IV, 1969). Subparagraph (7) further defines "general area of the Middle East" as the
"area between and including (1) Libya on the west, (2) Turkey on the north, (3)
Pakistan on the east, and (4) Saudi Arabia and Ethopia on the south ...."
Under section 1153(a)(7), 10,200 numbers are allotted each fiscal year for persons
falling within this definition. Conditional entry status is accorded to the refugee.
Under the proviso to section 1153(a)(7), after a period of two years in the United
States, a conditional entrant may apply to have his status adjusted to that of an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence. For the permanent resident alien who does
not qualify under any accelerated naturalization provision, five years of permanent
resident status is necessary preceding an application for citizenship. 8 U.S.C. § 14 27(a)
(1964). See gene-rally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401-89 (1964).
568 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. IV, 1969). After two years of status in the United
States pursuant to section 1253(h), the alien is eligible to apply for a visa under the
proviso to section 1153(a)(7). See note 55 supra.
The determination of eligibility under section 1253(h) is made by the Attorney
General. The withholding of deportation is solely a discretionary matter.
57 There is a third provision under United States law which is employed to allow
the admission of refugees. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1964). This section grants the
Attorney General discretionary power to "parole into the United States temporarily
under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed
strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United States . ...
Aliens paroled into the United States pursuant to this provision are eligible after a
two year period to apply for permanent resident status under the proviso to section
1153(a)(7). See note 52 supra. This provision will be discussed in some depth later.
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qualify, but first there must be a specific finding by the President.
In this respect, it is not consistently available as are the other two
provisions.
The words "well-founded" do not appear in section 1153 (a) (7)
to modify "fear of persecution," as they do in the Convention.
However, "fear of persecution" is interpreted to include an objec-
tive element which renders the omission of the qualifying phrase-
ology insignificant. The applicable grounds - "race, religion, or
political opinion" - are narrower than those set forth by the Con-
vention. To fall within the definition, the alien must "have fled."
This requirement disqualifies numerous persons who would meet the
test of being outside their State of nationality under the Convention.
Under the "have fled" criterion, the person who has left his home-
land for other reasons and cannot return for fear of persecution
will not come within the statutory language.
The administration of section 1153 (a) (7) greatly limits its scope.
As delineated by the statute, the alien must present himself to an
officer of the Immigration and Naturalization Service in a non-
Communist State. Such offices are located in seven designated coun-
tries: France, Germany, Belgium, Austria, Greece, and Lebanon.
Therefore, even though an alien may meet all the other require-
ments, he must also present himself at a designated location. There
are no authorized offices in Asia, Africa, or the Western Hemi-
sphere. The combined effect of the definition contained in section
1153(a)(7) and the administration of this provision is to exclude
most recognized refugee groups from entry into the United States.
The inadequacy of section 1153(a)(7) to provide a sufficiently
flexible refugee policy has resulted in the use of parole authorized
by section 1182(d)(5). This provision has been utilized to admit
refugees into the United States when they did not qualify under the
definition of section 1153 (a) (7) or when there were not sufficient
numbers available to meet the demand. The most extensive
use of section 1182(d)(5) has been to admit Cuban refugees to
the United States. 8 The most recent large scale use of section
1182(d)(5) occured when the 10,200 numbers available under
section 1153(a)(7) for fiscal year 1970 were exhausted by Febru-
ary 1970, five months still remaining before more numbers would
become available. However, even the tremendous flexibility afforded
by section 1182(d) (5) has not fully compensated for the limitations
58Since the inception of the Cuban airlift in December 1965, approximately
350,000 natives of Cuba have been paroled into the United States.
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inherent in section 1153(a)(7). Since the Cuban refugees did
not come within the definition of section 1153(a)(7), they were
not eligible to adjust their status to lawfully admitted permanent
resident aliens after the two year period. Consequently, the Act of
November 2, 1966, was passed, permitting Cuban refugees to adjust
status.59
Section 1253(h) is considered as providing narrower statutory
standards for refugee status than that under section 1153(a)(7).'
III. MODIFICATION OF EXISTING DEFINITIONS
From the preceding discussion, two propositions clearly evolve.
First, the refugee is at the will of a definition and its administration.
Second, each definition is basically functional in nature and is
created in light of certain predetermined objectives.
It is not essential that every definition be identical. There are
legitimate reasons why States of first asylum insist upon certain re-
strictions not necessary to the ultimate State of immigration or re-
settlement. The objective of the definition justifies its phraseology.
For purposes of providing basic food and material assistance, a defi-
nition should be broadly drawn. The scope may be more confined
where the granting of a potentially permanent immigration status
is involved. The difference in emphasis of international agreements,
national laws, and humanitarian organizations should result in each
State applying a definition designed to accomplish its specific goals.
However, there presently exists too great a disparity between
the various definitions to provide the de facto refugee with necessary
protection and assistance. The policies of many States contain dis-
criminatory features. Countries, both in structuring international
definitions and national definitions, are often too inhibited by paro-
chial interests. The definitions tend to contain artificial distinctions.
A definition should be formulated so that it can be applied with
flexibility and regard for humanitarian and social factors.
A review of the major definitions and their application in the
context of these general observations clearly demonstrates that mod-
ification and revision are necessary.
5 9 Pub. L. No. 89-732 (1966), noted at 8 U.S.C § 1255 (Supp. IV, 1959). See
note 52 supra.
60 Evans, Political Refugees and the United States Immigration Laws: A Case Note,
62 AM. J. INT'L L. 921, 926 (1968).
Since section 1153(a)(7) is restrictive and narrow, section 1253(h), which is not
as broad in scope, will not be considered in detail, but will be regarded as badly needing
reform. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1964); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1253(h) (1970).
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The international definition contained in the Convention and
Statute should be modified to include persons displaced within their
borders. Obviously, such a modification without further restriction
would cause adverse effects where an international body declared
persons within national borders to be refugees entitled to certain
benefits. At a minimum, the definition should be expanded to in-
clude persons displaced as a result of natural calamity or military
operations and who are unable to return to their usual place of
abode. The concept of "'well-founded fear of persecution" should
be interpreted in a more flexible manner with regard to specific in-
dividuals. The Statute should also be amended to include persecu-
tion for reasons of membership of a particular social group.
The geographical limitation of "events occurring in Europe"
should be abolished as an option under the Convention and the
abolition should be retrospective as well as prospective. However,
political realities may prevent the retroactive application of this pro-
vision. Certainly, no State should be allowed to accede to the Con-
vention before accession to ;the Protocol. In this manner, a State
can take advantage of the option of limiting the scope of both docu-
ments to events occurring in Europe. In fact, it would be advan-
tageous if no State were allowed to accede to the Convention without
simultaneous accession to the Protocol. This would also prevent
any State from becoming a party only to the Convention, thus
limiting its obligation to events occurring before January 1, 1951.
This could be accomplished by merely closing accession to the Con-
vention. Ideally, the Convention should be amended to delete the
temporal limitation.
However, political realities must be considered here, too, when
weighing which course of action to take. It is better to have a
State become party to an international agreement with restrictions
and limitations than for it to elect not be become party at all. How-
ever, certain modifications are urgently needed to offer a modicum
of international recognition to the changing characteristics of the
ever increasing world refugee population."
61 The legal ad viser to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees is particularly concerned about what effect the broadening of the definition
will have on States of first asylum. He stated:
It is questionable whether these countries would in the present circum-
stances agree to a broader definition and that they would open their doors and
be willing to grant a favorable status to a much wider group of persons with
all the difficulties of identification open to amendment means to expose them
to all the hazards of a political discussion, the result of which cannot be fore-
seen.
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The need for revision of the United States refugee policy is
much more urgent than reform in the international arena. The
definition should be expanded to encompass refugees other than
those who are victims of presecution in Communist States or the
Middle East. A refugee should be defined as any person who would
be subject to persecution regardless of the situs of the oppression.
The term should include persons displaced from their usual place
of abode, not limited to persons who have fled. The grounds of
persecution should be expanded to include nationality and member-
ship in a particular social group. As turmoil in developing States
continues to increase, persecution based on these grounds becomes
more prevalent, even to the point of virtual genocide.
The limiting nature of the placement of refugee offices should
be abolished. Since in most cases it is virtually impossible for the
refugee to present himself at the United States border or at one of
the designated seven foreign locations, the number of locations
should be greatly expanded and distributed in a less discriminatory
fashion throughout the world.62 The United States proper should
be considered a valid location. 63  Also, military operation should
be included as a valid ground for displacement.
There are significant similarities in the slight modification pro-
Address by Dr. Paul Weis, National Conference on World Refugee Problems, Nov. 18,
1969.
62 This could be accomplished through the issuance of visas to refugees rather than
conditional entry status. The administration of section 1153(a)(7) would be placed
within the purview of the Department of State. Since the Department of State is
represented in virtually every State, the processing of refugee applications would not be
confined to the present designated countries. Moreover, this would conserve manpower
of the Department of Justice which has not processed refugees in many areas because
the demand is so small that it does not justify placement of an office. United States
Representative Michael A. Feighan and Senator Edward M. Kennedy have introduced
bills which would amend section 1153(a)(7) to issue visas rather than conditional entry
status. H.R. 15092, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(a)(7) (1969); S. 2524, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 6(a)(7) (1969).
63 Interestingly, the United States is not at present a location from which an alien
can petition. 8 C.F.R. § 235.9 (1970); Tai Mui v. Esperdy, 371 F.2d 772 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1017 (1967) (regulation held valid). See also Smith,
Refugees, 367 THE ANNALS 43 (1966). The Immigration and Naturalization Service
indicates that between June 30, 1946, and June 30, 1969, approximately 896,346 ref-
ugees were admitted to the United States. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SER-
vICE, ANNUAL REPORT 45 (1969). The projected increase, attributable primarily to
Cuban refugees, section 1153(a)(7) refugees, and parolees under section 1182(d)(5),
will result in approximately 60,000 refugees for fiscal year 1970. Moreover, the total
figure is several hundred thousand below what it should be because it includes only
Cubans who have adjusted status under the Act of November 2, 1966, 8 U.S.C. §
1255 (Supp. IV, 1969), rather than the total number of Cubans paroled into the United
States. There is no precise figure available for the Cuban refugees. However, since
December 1965 48,000 per year have entered on the airlift.
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posed to the language of the international agreements and the more
pervasive revisions suggested concerning the United States definition.
The United States has traditionally aspired to a leadership role
in the treatment of refugees. 4 It is estimated that since World War
II, approximately 1,000,000 refugees have been admitted to the
United States.65  Particularly in light of the recent accession to the
Protocol, the United States should adopt a policy as broad as that
in the international arena. Adoption of such a definition would
eliminate discriminatory overtones from the general refugee provi-
sion. The abolition of the national origins quota system by the Act
of October 3, 1965, and the establishment of a non-discriminatory
immigration policy should be carried over into the field of refugees
where humanitarian concerns are even more significant.
Moreover, adoption of a definition similar to that contained in
the international agreements to which the United States has acceded
would enable the United States to better comply with the terms of
the Protocol. The Convention forbids a contracting State from ex-
pelling or returning a refugee to the frontiers of a territory where
his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political
opinion.66 A "refugee" is defined in far broader terms in the Con-
vention than in section 1153(a)(7) which sets forth the criteria
governing those who may be admitted. Furthermore, administra-
tion of section 1153(a)(7) prevents the granting of conditional
entry at a United States border. Section 1253(h) will protect the
refugee once he is admitted, but it will not aid in his entry. Thus,
only through the exercise of the discretionary power of section
1182(d) (5) or through returning the refugee to a State where he
will not be persecuted can the United States fulfill its obligation. 7
64 S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra note 3, at 6.
6 5 UNITED STATES COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, WORLD REFUGEE REPORT 20
(1969).
66 Convention, supra note 12, art. 33. By acceding to the Protocol, the party is
bound by the substantive provisions of the Convention.
67 See Weis, The International Protection of Refugees, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 193,
198-99 (1954). Krenz elaborates on the problem of asylum in general by stating:
The problem of asylum is therefore to be broken down into three separate
issues. First, the asylum seeker is to gain physical presence inside the territory
of the State of refuge. The duty of States not to repel refugees at their
frontiers has been termed the "principle of non-refoulement." Secondly, the
admittance of an asylum seeker consists in the legitimation of his stay and
constitutes, in a sense, the actual recognition of his refugee quality. Only
at this point comes the third element, that of the refugee's status in the country
of asylum.
19701
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
Moreover, section 1253(h) standards should also be broadened.
The deportation of a refugee coming within the definition of the
Convention is an obvious breach of international agreement.
The standard prescribed by section 1253(h) should be identical
to that in the general refugee provision. It is absurd to have stricter
criteria for withholding deportation than for admission.
By amending the definition, the United States would also be
affirming the philosophy of Article 14 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights which proclaims that "everyone has the right to
seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution." '68 Any
broadening of the international definition would similarly serve to
implement this Declaration. "9
Since the United States has no common borders with countries
from which asylum seekers pour forth, there would be little danger
of inundation with refugees. States having such common borders
are necessarily more reluctant to obligate themselves to grant legal
admission to all refugees crossing their frontiers.7 °
I would propose that the following basic elements be incorporated
into both -the international definition and the United States defini-
tion:
The term "refugee" means any person, (I) who owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion, is outside his usual place of abode and is unable or, owing
to such fear, unwilling to return there, or (I I) who owing to
natural calamity or military operations is outside his usual place of
abode and is unable to return there.
Krenz, The Refugee as a Subject of International Law, 15 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 90, 103
(1966).
Under this breakdown, the crises under United States law comes in the first stage.
The problem is complicated in the case of a group of refugees presenting them-
selves because it is possible section 1182(d)(5) is not available. The legislative history
surrounding the Act of October 3, 1965, clearly states that the parole provisions were
designed to authorize the Attorney General to act only in emergent, individual, and
isolated situations, such as the case of an alien who requires immediate medical atten-
tion, and not for the immigration of classes or groups outside of the limit of the law.
S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1965). H.R. REP. No. 745, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 15-16 (1965).
68 G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948), reprinted in 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 127
(Supp. 1949).
69 See Weis, supra note 67, at 196.
70See Krenz, supra note 67, at 105-07, for an interesting discussion concerning
the rejection of a right of admission during the deliberations in the United Nations
leading to the adoption of the 1951 Convention. The United Nations instead adopted
Recommendation D of the Final Act "that Governments continue to receive refugees
in their territories and that they act in concert in a true spirit of international coopera-
tion in order that these refugees may find asylum and the possibility of resettlements."
189 U.N.T.S. 137, 148 (1954).
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Appropriate administrative discretion in the application of this
definition by the United States could serve as the mechanism to
prevent embarrassing foreign relations problems which might result
from a determination that certain persons had been dislocated within
a State because of persecution. However, reasonable restriction
through administration would be far preferable to a general defini-
tion lacking necessary flexibility. Moreover, since virtually any de
facto refugee could qualify under this definition, section 1182(d) (5)
could be used primarily to provide extra numbers in exceptional
situations but still observe the basic criteria of eligibility.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is necessary to realize that the refugee problem today is world-
wide, ever-increasing, and will be with us for an indeterminate
period of time. This proposed broadened definition of refugee cri-
teria is important if we are to readily cope with these unfortunate
victims of injustice. The States of the international community
must recognize their responsibility and come to the assistance of
refugees in all categories created through the proposed broadened
definition.
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